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As the year draws to an end, all eyes in the Western 
Balkans turn somewhat nervously towards Brussels 
and the European Commission’s annual Enlargement 
Strategy and Progress Report. This year, results were 
rather mixed, but the Commission attempted to stress 
the positive aspects. According to the Commission, in 
general, this past year has witnessed ‘new momentum’ 
in the enlargement process, and important milestones
were achieved. From December, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and Albania will join the visa liberalisation regime 
(implemented in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia 
in December 2009), showing that even the laggards 
can meet the required standards when the condi-
tions are clear and the incentives compelling.Monte-
negro is ready to become an official EU candidate in 
December. Serbia’s application for EU membership, 
submitted in December 2009, has now been sent to 
the Commission, which is expected to issue a formal 
‘opinion’ and recommendation to EU member states 
before the end of 2011. Serbia not only hopes to be 
granted candidate status (like Macedonia, and shortly 
Montenegro), but also expects the opening of imme-
diate accession negotiations.
Croatia, commended for ‘steady progress’, has re-
sumed accession talks, which are now at a ‘final stage’ 
after several months of stagnation due to a border dis-
pute with Slovenia. This, if not yet resolved, would be 
dealt with bilaterally according to an agreed process 
that should not affect Croatia’s EU entry. If talks pro-
ceed without further hitches, the Accession Treaty will 
be ready for signature sometime in the second half of 
2011. Accession will follow about a year later, once all 
member states have ratified the treaty.This will repre-
sent a landmark for the enlargement process.
For the Commission, Croatia’s future accession shows 
the remaining countries of the region that they too 
could enjoy the same prospects provided they fulfil 
the required conditions. This should encourage addi-
tional efforts in the Western Balkans to speed up the 
pace of reform.
This article was originally published in English by FRIDE in December 2010
http://www.fride.org/publication/840/the-eu-and-the-western-balkans:-preparing-for-the-long-haul
60
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 0, February 2011
©IdPS
ISSN 2039-8573 OnLine
Highlights
????? ???????????? ??????? ?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????? ??????? ? ???????????????????
of the region will have to work hard for many years before it is ready to join.
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
depends on deep reforms in theWestern Balkans region.
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ????????????????????????????????
quality of the process, building popular trust in political elites and institutions, and enhancing mutual understanding 
between the EU and theWestern Balkans.
Nonetheless, concerns abound that the EU’s preoc-
cupation with its huge internal problems, especially 
regarding the euro’s legitimacy in the face of the 
threat of economic meltdown in Greece, Ireland and 
possibly other member states, could further diminish 
the Union’s enthusiasm for enlargement towards the 
Balkans. Thus, Croatia’s accession could be the last for 
many years, perhaps a decade or more. But govern-
ments in the Western Balkans need a much faster pace 
of integration if they are to be motivated to sell tough
reforms to weary electorates.
Dreams postponed
The sober reality is that several years need to pass be-
fore the remaining aspirants in the Western Balkans 
region are able to join. And it is not just a question 
of how many years it will take the EU to overcome its 
current economic woes, regain confidence and turn 
its attention back to its unfinished business in the Bal-
kans. There are practical, technical limits too, as well 
as longstanding weaknesses in theWestern Balkans 
states that need to be addressed. 
Thus, if Serbia, for example, which is often cited as the 
most administratively capable among the remaining 
states of the region, were indeed invited to begin ac-
cession negotiations in, let’s say, early 2012, it is hard 
to imagine it concluding them much faster than Croa-
tia. This would
imply a realistic accession date of 2019–20. But Serbia 
still has to deal with two specific political challenges 
before being deemed fit to enter accession talks: first, 
capturing indicted war criminals, and second, better 
cooperation with the EU over Kosovo.
While the Netherlands agreed in October that Serbia’s 
membership application could be forwarded to the 
Commission for consideration, it still insists on Serbia 
handing over indicted war criminals Ratko Mladic and 
Goran Hadzic to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) before allowing any 
further steps towards EU membership. Most mem-
ber states felt that Serbia deserved to be rewarded 
for dropping its confrontational stance over Kosovo. 
At the United Nations in September, President Tadic 
finally took the reins back from his abrasive young for-
eign minister, Vuk Jeremic, and agreed to a joint EU-
Serbia resolution that committed Serbia to dialogue 
with Kosovo without reopening the status question. 
In recognition of the Netherlands’ flexibility over Ser-
bia’s membership application, the EU reiterated (to 
the Netherlands satisfaction) that ‘full cooperation’ 
with the ICTY – meaning delivery of the indicted war 
criminals – was a sine qua non condition to gaining 
candidate status. President Tadic has therefore one 
year to solve the question that has long bedevilled 
Serbia’s European prospects and that, if unattended 
to, will block Serbia’s otherwise quite good chances of 
securing candidate status in 2011.
Unfortunately, the latest report on Serbia’s perfor-
mance in this respect, to be delivered in December 
to the United Nations by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge 
Brammertz, will not be encouraging. In recent state-
ments, Brammertz declared that, as late as 2006, Ser-
bia’s security forces deliberately missed the chance 
of arresting Mladic. The current Serbian war crimes 
prosecutor, Vladimir Vukcevic, admitted as much in 
a press interview in November. The main problem is 
that Serbia’s political leaders are still unable effectively 
to control the security forces responsible for arresting 
the fugitives. Similarly, they seem to lack the courage 
to confront key individuals firmly ensconced in those 
forces, who are allegedly connected to the shadowy 
Serbian underworld that assassinated former Prime 
Minister Zoran Dzindzic when he started to pose seri-
ous challenges.
In addition, there is the still uncertain course of the Ko-
sovo dialogue scheduled to begin early next year. At 
present, Kosovo’s leaders are the ones who are drag-
ging their feet, having called for early elections in De-
cember after the fall of the government in Pristina – 
much to the EU’s frustration, as it wanted talks to start 
straight away. In the meantime, however, Serbia has to 
start preparing its answers to the questionnaire that 
Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele delivered to 
Belgrade on 24 November. The questionnaire includes
thousands of detailed questions on all aspects of Ser-
bia’s policy-making, administrative and regulatory 
structures, legislative framework and laws relevant to 
its EU bid. It is on this basis that the Commission will 
produce its opinion and its recommendation on Ser-
bia’s application. 
Although Serbia had started working on draft an-
swers to the anticipated questionnaire long before 
the application was submitted, there is no doubt that, 
in many fields, Serbia’s insistence on Kosovo being a 
part of Serbia will greatly complicate matters. What 
may seem narrow, technical questions could rapidly 
lead to political minefields that the technocrats of the 
European Integration Office will have to throw onto 
the overloaded desks of their political masters. These 
might prove hard to handle as the electoral cycle ap-
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proaches, with both president and parliament reach-
ing the limits of their terms in early 2012.
Even if these political time bombs can be sidestepped,
the Commission’s latest Progress Report on Serbia 
points out just how much still has to be done with re-
gard to the ‘normal’ reform agenda if the country is to 
be granted candidate status. Having read the previous 
progress reports, the Commission’s critical tone this 
year is unsurprising. Serbia has failed to address long-
standing weaknesses, particularly in the judicial field.
The general opinion that Serbia has developed an 
‘administrative capacity’ is only true in comparison 
with its neighbours, but still falls short of the stand-
ards required by the EU. Public administration reform 
and the fight against organised crime and corruption 
require ‘additional efforts’ too. Only ‘limited progress’ 
has been made in turning Serbia into a ‘functioning 
market economy’, and structural reforms, privatisa-
tion and labour market reforms have been postponed 
again this year. 
So much energy and attention has been consumed 
on the Kosovo issue that nitty-gritty issues have been 
neglected. And just as the government seemed ready 
to focus on EU integration, it was knocked down by 
the severe impact of the European economic and fi-
nancial crisis and has had to turn to the International 
Monetary Fund. In other words, Serbia needs more 
time to handle its formidable political agenda: to di-
gest the loss of Kosovo; unravel the sinister tentacles 
of the ‘deep state’ that stunt its democracy; overhaul 
the judiciary and the state administration in order to 
entrench the rule of law; and advance with the transi-
tion to a market economy. All this amidst a deep eco-
nomic crisis and dim prospects for foreign investment 
and assistance inflows.
If we look at Macedonia, we can also see the limits to 
accelerating the EU’s integration process. Macedonia 
gained EU candidate status in December 2005. This 
was done somewhat ‘prematurely’, some would ar-
gue, given that the country was then in much poor-
er shape in technical, administrative and economic 
terms than Serbia is today. The decision was political 
and belonged to a reward package for implementing
the politically difficult Ohrid Agreement that settled 
the terms of peaceful coexistence between Macedo-
nia’s ethnic Macedonians (Slavs) and its sizeable Al-
banian minority after the country narrowly avoided 
civil war in 2001. Nevertheless, political stability in 
Macedonia remains fragile, and political life polarised 
not only along ethnic lines but also within the ethnic 
communities themselves. Although Macedonia has 
worked hard and made huge progress (for example, 
the country has for several years been near the top of
the World Bank’s rankings of improvers of business 
conditions), at times reform has been hostage to 
wider political struggles. For some time, Macedonia 
argued that it was ready to begin accession negotia-
tions, and indeed, needed to begin them in order to 
keep politics on track
– a telling reversal of the normal logic of conditionality 
that rewards states for keeping themselves on track.
In its 2009 Progress Report the Commission support-
ed Macedonia’s readiness to embark on accession ne-
gotiations, but domestic politics has become increas-
ingly poisoned by the protracted
– and increasingly bizarre – dispute with Greece over 
the country’s name and the language spoken by the 
Slavic majority. Festering since the very emergence of 
the state itself back in 1991, the dispute now blocks 
Macedonia’s accession to both NATO and the EU, due 
to Greece’s veto. This, in turn, frustrates the Albanians, 
for whom the name issue is a symbolic matter of no 
significance and who consider NATO and EU integra-
tion a priority. The government, increasingly dominat-
ed by strident – and popular – Macedonian national-
ists, has been adding fuel to the fire. It has embarked 
on an extravagant programme to rebuild the centre of 
Skopje that includes a gigantic, central statue of Alex-
ander the Great. This not only inflames Greek outrage
at the ‘expropriation’ of what they see as essentially 
Greek cultural heritage, but also infuriates Albanians 
and the Macedonian opposition who see it as a wilful 
squandering of scarce resources.
In this year’s report, in a heroic understatement the 
Commission notes the need to ‘strengthen political di-
alogue’ and desist from ‘actions and statements which 
could adversely affect good neighbourly relations’. Al-
though the Commission continues to back Macedo-
nia’s hopes to begin entry talks, it also underlines that 
reforms have continued ‘at an uneven pace’ in the past 
year. There remains a lengthy state building agenda
before Macedonia fully meets EU membership ob-
ligations. Thus, while Greece’s behaviour towards 
Macedonia shocks most of its European partners, the 
Macedonian government is far from innocent. How-
ever, even if this political spat were to melt away and 
Macedonia began accession negotiations next year, 
for instance, state weakness and politico-institutional 
fragility would continue to slow the pace of the inte-
gration process.
62
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 0, February 2011
©IdPS
ISSN 2039-8573 OnLine
Good things come to those who wait
Sustaining the momentum of EU enlargement is 
clearly vital to consolidating peace and security in the 
Western Balkans, but the onerous process of preparing 
for EU accession cannot be rushed. Excessive pressure 
can also strain democratic institutions and democratic 
practices in weak states in transition. Harmonising the 
vast array of laws, regulations and policies with the 
EU’s acquis – now approaching some 100,000 pages 
– almost inevitably leads to short-cuts in the demo-
cratic process, leaving little scope or time for serious 
parliamentary debate and scrutiny. This can reinforce 
the already strong tendency in leader-dominated po-
litical cultures to concentrate power in the hands of 
the government, and to centralise control within a 
narrow elite.
The argument that ‘there is no alternative’ to the dic-
tates of the EU is open to exploitation by governments
that are frequently intolerant towards civil society 
criticism and exercise an iron rule over their party sup-
porters through their extensive powers of patronage. 
Laws drafted in excessive haste by overworked legal 
experts, sometimes by simply cutting and pasting 
fromEU templates, often turn out to be incompatible 
with existing laws, requiring frequent amendments 
and revisions. All this generates a sense of legal insta-
bility that hardly contributes to strengthening the rule 
of law.
It also has several implications for the development 
of a wider democratic political culture. While for the 
region the strategic importance of joining the EU is 
clear, the European Union can loom almost too large 
in domestic politics, eclipsing the equally important 
challenge of strengthening the democratic account-
ability of political leaders and the population’s trust in 
political institutions. Successive opinion polls conducted 
by the Gallup Balkan Monitor (www.balkan-monitor.eu) 
reveal the very low level of popular trust in govern-
ments, parliaments, political parties and the judiciary. 
In most states of the region, vast majorities profess to 
have ‘only a little trust’ or ‘no trust at all’ in their govern-
ment.
What people want to see is greater effort to bring 
about immediate, tangible improvements in their eve-
ryday standards of living and employment prospects. 
EU integration, a dominant question during election 
time, offers no quick fix here, yet competing party pro-
grammes rarely address these issues with clear and 
practical, alternative policies. Thus, it is unsurprising 
that approximately twothirds of citizens in Serbia, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and Macedonia say that no poli-
tician or political party really represents their views. 
The EU could be an important ally for domestic civil 
society in the region, by providing relatively impartial 
information on governments’ performance and sup-
porting capacity-development. However, NGOs also 
need to build strong and extensive roots in the wider 
society in general, which remains a passive and scepti-
cal observer of the EU’s integration processes.
How can the European Union maintain the credibility 
of the ‘EU perspective’ in the region? The EU’s own poor 
performance in this respect is widely acknowledged, 
but further transparency and realism are also needed 
with regard to the challenges facing the Western Bal-
kans over the next decade. The Greek foreign minister 
recently floated again the idea of setting a clear acces-
sion timetable for the rest of the region after Croatia’s
accession. But there is still strong resistance in Brussels 
and many member state capitals, which are mindful 
of the political pressures raised by the arguably pre-
mature accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.
But more important than the timing of accession it-
self, is the effectiveness of the reforms carried out in 
the years preceding that. In the coming years, the EU 
needs to get over its introversion and redouble its ef-
forts to support such reforms, engage with more de-
termination in ‘member state building’, especially in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and improve its 
communication with the general public both in the 
region and at home. In the economic field, the EU 
should allocate more resources to development and 
growth, not just the implementation of the acquis, tai-
lored mainly to the needs of much more prosperous
and sophisticated economies.
In the interim, the abolition of the visa regime for 
the Balkans this year is perhaps the most promis-
ing and significant gesture that the EU could make. 
EU support for ‘people-to-people’ exchanges must 
now expand so that citizens in the Western Balkans 
can more easily experience the European way of 
life. They may indeed find it sobering, but this is 
no bad thing if it entails a more realistic, down-to-
earth, and solid understanding of what they can 
expect of the EU, and what they must demand of 
their own governments if their aspirations are to 
be achieved.
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